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INTRODUCTION 
his paper is about freedom of information in the European 
Union (hereafter: EU) in general and about Regulation 
(EG) No 1049/2001 in particular, which deals with various 
aspects of public access to documents. 
When addressing the topic of freedom of information with regard 
to the EU, the provisions which promptly and prominently spring 
to mind are enshrined in its so-called primary law2. In the EU’s 
legal framework, the remarkable importance which nowadays is 
attached to transparency is evidenced by the fact that freedom of 
information, in the broader meaning of the word, is anchored in 
several outstanding provisions of primary law, amongst which can 
be numbered Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereafter: TFEU), and Article 11 and Article 42 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights3 (hereafter: Charter). 
For the purpose of this paper, let us start with the Charter. Its 
Article 11, the scope of which is “freedom of expression and 
information”, provides for the freedom “to receive and impart 
information”. It must be noted, however, that Article 11 basically 
applies to publicly available information. 
                                                
1 The opinions expressed are personal to the authors and do not bind the Court of justice. 
2 Primary law, as may be noted for the reader uncommon with EU legal terminology, can 
be seen as the supreme source of law in the EU. It is at the apex of the European legal 
order. As it is, EU primary law consists mainly of the founding treaties of the European 
Union, as amended and adapted by different Treaties and Acts, and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. As opposed to primary law, secondary 
sources of EU law are legal instruments based on the Treaties. Those instruments include 
unilateral secondary law (notably regulations, directives, decisions, and recommendations), 
conventions and agreements. 
3 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ, 30.3.2010, C 83, p. 
389, in its version as referred to in the consolidated Treaties on European Union and 
Functioning of the European Union) provides for specific rights conferred to European 
Union citizens and residents but also, in some cases, to third country citizens. Originally 
drafted by the European Convention, the Charter was proclaimed on 7 December 2000, 
but it only gained full legal effect, and equal rank to the treaties (see Article 6[1] TUE), in 
2009 by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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As far as access to documents is concerned, freedom of 
information is seconded by Article 42 of the Charter. That Article 
states that “[a]ny citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal 
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, 
has a right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union, whatever their medium”.  
A proud affirmation of principle, couched in general terms! It does 
not mean, however, that EU citizens are free to access to any EU 
document as they please. On the contrary, the Charter not only 
enshrines freedoms, but also provides for a general rule on 
limitations of those rights.  
As Article 52 of the Charter puts it, “[a]ny limitation on the exercise 
of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must be 
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations 
may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need 
to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”  
In the same line of thought, Article 15(3) TFEU also makes it clear 
that access to documents is “subject to […] conditions”. “[L]imits 
on grounds of public or private interest governing [the] right of 
access to documents shall be determined by the European 
Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.” Moreover, 
“[e]ach institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its 
proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate in its own Rules of 
Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in 
accordance with the regulations referred to”.  
In the light of the Charter and of Article 15 TFEU, it thereby 
ensues that even if certain “limits … governing [the] right of access 
to documents” can be determined under EU law, any act which 
interferes with public access to documents must leave the 
“essence” of Article 42 of the Charter unblemished and, even more 
important, be “[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality”. 
So much for the legal basis provided for by primary law. However, 
one would be mistaken if one imagined that the Charter was the 
birthplace of access to documents of EU institutions. As a matter 
of fact, the principle of granting access to EU documents is deeply 
rooted in the history of EU law, whereas the Charter is a 
comparatively recent instrument.  
This being the case, it is appropriate to provide a very short 
overview of legislation on transparency within the EU. 
As soon as in 1992, access to documents had been identified as a 
key issue in a “Declaration on the right of access to information”4, 
which was annexed to the so-called Maastricht Treaty. Following 
                                                
4 Declaration on the right of access to information (OJ, 29.7.1992, C 101, p. 101): “The 
Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the 
democratic nature of the institutions and the public’s confidence in the administration. 
The Conference accordingly recommends that the Commission submit to the Council no 
later than 1993 a report on measures designed to improve public access to the information 
available to the institutions.” 
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that Maastricht Declaration, not only a code of conduct was 
adopted5, but also a Council Decision6. That Decision shed some 
light on how access to documents was to be granted in practice. It 
triggered a rich case law of the Court of justice7.  
As for now, however, Regulation (EC) No 1049/20018 is to be 
considered the cornerstone of a wide-ranking, but rather scattered 
framework of EU secondary law9 on public access to documents. 
Therefore, and for purposes of simplification, Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 shall be the center of interest of this paper. The paper 
will first give an overview of the Regulation’s scope, before moving 
on to its legal basis. The most substantial portion of the paper will 
then dwell in some depth on elementary provisions of Regulation 
(EC) No 1049/2001 and, finally, examine the relevant case law of 
the Court of justice. 
On the face of it, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 only applies to 
the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Commission10, but the gist of the rules it contains goes way beyond. 
In fact, there are provisions in the very legal acts establishing 
various other bodies and agencies which make Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 applicable to them as well. That is the reason why the 
Regulation rightly deserves to be deemed “the cornerstone” of the 
current legal framework governing access to documents. 
To get a solid grip on the Regulation and its scope, some remarks 
as to its legal basis are in order. As evidenced by its recitals, 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 was solely based on Article 255(1) 
                                                
5 Code of conduct (93/730/EC) concerning public access to Council and Commission 
documents (OJ, 31.12.1993, p. 41). 
6 Council Decision 93/731/EC of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council 
documents (OJ, 31.12.1993, L 340, p. 43). 
7 For a review of the case-law relating to that decision see C. Naômé, The case-law of the 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities on transparency: from 
Carvel to Hautala (1995-2001), in INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?, 
2002, pp. 147-198. 
8 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents (OJ, 31.5.2001, L 145, p. 43). 
9 In addition to Regulation No 1049/2001, there are some more secondary law instruments 
granting access to documents, namely with regard to specific sectors: see, for instance, 
Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 
on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 
90/313/EEC (OJ, 14.2.2003, L 41, p. 26), and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community 
institutions and bodies (OJ, 25.9.2006, L 264, p. 13). 
10 Specific rules apply e.g. to the European Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors and the European 
Central Bank. 
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and (2) EC (now Article 15 [3] TFEU11) and not on the Charter12. 
Given that the Charter was not yet legally binding at the time 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 was adopted, this does not come 
as a surprise. In the meantime, however, things have changed with 
the Charter coming into force, in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, 
on 1 December 2009. The Charter now being part of EU primary 
law, the least that can be said is that applications for access to a 
document made since December 2009 indubitably fall within the 
substantive and temporal field of application of the Charter, as 
defined in its Article 51. Therefore, whatever its past and its 
background, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 is now to be 
construed in accordance with the rules and principles established 
in the Charter. 
Those preliminary remarks now lead us to examine the provisions 
of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 in detail. The core of those 
provisions has been solid and stable for a substantial period of 
time, despite various proposals for recasting or amending. Some of 
them have been under way for quite a while. They reflect diverging 
opinions as to how Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 should be 
recast. The ongoing process illuminates the interests at stake and 
deserves some explanatory observations. 
§ 1 – REGULATION (EC) NO 1049/2001 AND RECAST 
PROPOSALS 
Section A will deal with the legal pattern of the Regulation, whereas 
Section B will be about the recast proposals. 
A) The legal pattern of Regulation No 1049/2001 
The objectives the EU lawmaker pursued when adopting 
Regulation No 1049/2001 have been made apparent in the 
Regulation’s preamble, which comprises 17 recitals. In a nutshell, 
and as demonstrated in those recitals, what the legislator had in 
                                                
11 Article 15(3) TFEU states:  
“Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered 
office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and 
the conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph. 
General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of access to 
documents shall be determined by the European Parliament and the Council, by means of 
regulations, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.  
Each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are transparent 
and shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to 
its documents, in accordance with the regulations referred to in the second subparagraph.  
The Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the 
European Investment Bank shall be subject to this paragraph only when exercising their 
administrative tasks. 
The European Parliament and the Council shall ensure publication of the documents 
relating to the legislative procedures under the terms laid down by the regulations referred 
to in the second subparagraph.” (emphasis added) 
12 It must be said, however, that the Charter is mentioned in the Regulation’s preamble. 
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mind essentially amounts to open government – tempered by some 
important exceptions to prevent abuse. 
According to recital 2, “openness enables citizens to participate 
more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that 
the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective 
and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. 
Openness contributes to strengthening the principles of 
democracy and respect for fundamental rights as laid down in the 
[Treaties13] and the [Charter]”. As recital 4 of Regulation No 
1049/2001 puts it, the purpose of the Regulation is “to give the 
fullest possible effect to the right of public access to documents 
and to lay down the general principles and limits on such access in 
accordance with [the Treaties]”.14 
If recital 2 refers to “administration”” in the broad sense of the 
term, recital 6 particularly refers to legislative procedures, along the 
following lines: “wider access should be granted to documents in 
cases where the institutions are acting in their legislative capacity, 
… while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of the institutions’ 
decision-making process” (emphasis added)15. Such documents should 
be made directly accessible to the greatest possible extent.” Though 
stressing the principle of broad access, recital 6 alludes to possible 
limitations due to conflicting interests: Even though openness is to 
be given the fullest possible effect, there may be other interests at 
stake that ask for some limits. That restriction is perfectly in line 
with Article 15 TFEU.  
What is more, the idea of limitations, as embodied in notions such 
as “greatest possible extent” or “fullest possible effect”, is even 
more vigorously pursued in recital 9 with regard to “certain 
documents”. That recital underlines that they could be given 
special treatment “on account of their highly sensitive content”.  
As a more general rule, recital 11, although clinging to the principle 
that all kinds of documents should be accessible to the public, 
points out that “… certain public and private interests should be 
protected by way of exceptions. The institutions should be entitled 
to protect their internal consultations and deliberations where 
necessary to safeguard their ability to carry out their tasks.” 
In short, Regulation No 1049/2001, according to its recitals, 
contains a set of rules that is founded on the principle of access, 
                                                
13 See also recital 1 of the Regulation and its reference to Article 1 TEU. That commitment 
to openness and transparency is also recognized and emphasized in case-law, such as in 
the judgment of 1 July 2008, Sweden and Turco/Council, C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, 
EU:C:2008:374, paragraph 34, and more recently in the judgment of 27 February 2015, 
Breyer/Commission, T-188/12, (ECLI-code not yet available) paragraph 38. 
14 That recital is frequently quoted in case-law: see for instance judgments of 1 February 
2007, Sison/Council, C-266/05 P, EU:C:2007:75, paragraph 61; judgments of 18 
December 2007, Sweden/Commission, C-64/05 P, EU:C:2007:802, paragraph 53, and 
Sweden e.a./API and Commission, EU:C:2010:541, paragraph 69; and judgment of 27 
February 2015, Breyer/Commission, T-188/12, paragraph 39. 
15 That idea is in keeping with the exception laid down in primary law with regard to CJ, 
ECB and EIB. 
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while allowing for a number of exceptions shaped in rather broad 
wording.  
No wonder that the very interpretation of those exceptions is in 
the focus of the case-law of the Court of justice16, and of the 
General Court as well. How to strike a balance between conflicting 
interests recognized in EU law? That is what is usually at the heart 
of the matter. As Article 1 of Regulation No 1049/2001 puts it, its 
very purpose is to establish a general balance by defining “the 
principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public and private 
interest governing the right of access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission […] documents […]” and “to establish 
rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right”. 
Before having a closer look at some of the exceptions contained in 
Article 4 of the Regulation, and the way they affect the principle of 
openness, it might be helpful to describe the nature of the right of 
access, as granted by the Regulation. As a matter of fact, when it 
comes to the very nature of a right, it is essential to ascertain the 
identity of who can be its beneficiary (I), and its addressees (II), 
and to know what exactly is the subject-matter at hand, or, to be 
precise, what is meant by “documents”(III)? 
I) The Beneficiary concept, as enshrined in Article 2(1) and (2) of 
the Regulation, calls for two remarks to be made.  
First, and most importantly, it must be noted that “[a]ny citizen of 
the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to 
documents of the institutions, subject to the principles, conditions 
and limits defined in this Regulation.” Pursuant to that definition, 
the Regulation also applies to natural persons who are third-
country nationals.  
As far as non-residents are concerned, however, different 
considerations arise. Indeed, Article 1(2) makes it clear that the 
institutions “may […] grant access to documents to any natural or 
legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a 
Member State”. What that boils down to is the principle that EU 
“ins” get a better treatment than EU “outs”, whose access is left to 
the discretion of the institutions. Whatever the case, the number of 
potential applicants is nothing short of impressive. 
In the light of Article 1, it might be interesting to know how many 
applications are actually made under the scope of the Regulation. 
Exact figures are not very easy to be established. However, the case 
law of the European Courts, as reported in their annual reports, 
may provide some insight into this practical aspect of the matter: 
In fact, a refusal to grant access to a document asked for under 
Regulation No 1049/2001 can be challenged in front of the 
                                                
16 See judgment of 29 June 2010, Commission/Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, C-139/07 P, 
EU:C: 2010:376, paragraph 51; judgments of 28 June 2012, Kommission/Éditions Odile Jacob, 
C-404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393, paragraph 111, and Commission/Agrofert Holding, C-477/10 
P, EU:C:2012:394, paragraph 53; judgment of 21 September 2010, Sweden e. a./API and 
Commission, C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P und C-532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraphs 69 
and 70; judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland/Commission, C-514/11 P and 
C-605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 53. 
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General Court by means of an action for annulment pursuant 
Article 263 TFUE, with a possibility of review by the Court. 
So, for the sake of statistics, let us now for a moment leave the 
green pastures of the Regulation and move on to the more arid 
realm of sheer figures. 
In fact, if we have a glance at some recent data collected in the 
annual reports of the Court of Justice (for the years 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013 and 201417), it can be established that out of an overall 
of new cases registered for the respective years (ranging from 636 
new cases in 2010 to 912 new cases for 2014), the General Court 
had to deal with an average of about twenty cases regarding 
Regulation No 1049/2001 and related matters18. As far as 
completed cases go, the ratio is more or less similar. On the basis 
of those figures, it can be argued that access to documents, which 
is but a tiny item of EU law, accounts for a significant portion of 
the General Court’s case law. 
As far as the Court of justice is concerned, the figures are less 
impressive. In 2014, just one appeal was lodged with the Court in 
a subject-matter concerning access to documents. 4 cases were 
completed in 2014, 6 in 2013, 5 in 2012, 2 in 2011 and none in 
2010. When we look at the case material at hand, it is interesting to 
note that in many cases relating to Regulation No 1049/2001, 
where the refusal to grant access is confirmed by the General 
Court, it is not the applicant at first instance who lodges an appeal, 
but a Member State. In fact, as far as statistics go, there might be a 
difference in the perception of transparency and openness in 
general, and of public access to documents in particular, among the 
Member States. In fact, Northern Member States (Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Netherlands) seem to embrace openness with 
more enthusiasm than others (France, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Czech Republic, to name but a few). 
II) Addressees of the right of access to documents are, in the first 
place, the institutions named in the title of Regulation No 
1049/2001, i.e. Parliament, Council, and Commission. However, 
as highlighted in the latest proposal for an amendment19, the 
principle of access to documents extends to all the institutions of 
the European Union as named in Article 13(1) TEU, as well as to 
agencies, offices, and bodies. That idea is echoed in recital 8 of 
Regulation No 1049/2001, inviting the institutions – within the 
scope of the Regulation: Parliament, Council and Commission – to 
extend the applicability of this right to their agencies as well.  
                                                
17 The annual reports are available on the curia homepage via the following link 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7000/ or by going to the curia homepage, 
scrolling to “The institution” and then “Annual Report”.  
18 New cases (General Court): 2010 overall: 636, therein access to documents: 19; 2011 
overall: 722, therein access to documents: 21; 2012 overall: 617, therein access to documents: 
18; 2013 overall 790, therein access to documents: 20; 2014 overall 912, therein access to 
documents: 17. 
19 COM(2011) 137 final/2 (30.3.2011), Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. 
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As we will see now under section III, the nature of the addressee 
is closely linked to the nature of the document requested. 
III) Article 3 lit. a of the Regulation defines what is meant by 
document.  
What we are facing here is rather unique a concept.  
To start with a specialty first, as provided for in Article 9. In that 
provision, the Regulation refines the term “document” by referring 
to a subsection, known as sensitive document. Since there is no 
definition of what is meant by that, it is initially up to the institution 
(but eventually up to the Courts) to decide whether a document is 
to be deemed “sensitive”. The institution also decides at first hand 
whether one of the exceptions laid down in Article 4 is applicable. 
Finally, it decides whether the document requested is in fact held, 
and/or whether there is a need for prior consultation with a third 
party in order to be able to make a decision.  
According to Article 2(3), the right of access refers to documents 
held by an institution. In that regard, a document held is a 
document “drawn up or received by it [the institution] and in its 
possession, in all areas of activity of the European Union”. Thus, 
documents in “all areas” can be asked for20, and, at least with regard 
to what is said in Article 2(3), there is no specific authorship rule, 
providing an exclusive right to grant or refuse access. However, 
there may, in some cases, arise an obligation to consult the author. 
In fact, the latter may be considered a third party in the sense of 
the definition laid down in Article 3 lit. b. According to Article 4(4) 
“the institution shall [as regards third-party documents] consult the 
third party…”.21 
Although Member States are included in the definition of a third 
party in the sense of Article 4(4), Article 4(5) provides an additional 
right for Member States in the process of consultation. As a matter 
of fact, a Member State may specifically ask for non-disclosure of 
a document. When looking at the inner workings of Article 4, the 
co-existence of paragraphs 4 and 5 might appear confusing at first 
sight. It has been argued whether Article 4 (5) may be seen as 
conferring a veto-right on a Member State against disclosure.22 The 
wording (“without [the Member State’s] prior agreement”) is a 
support to this view, but the mere fact as such, when looked at 
more closely, may not be so very puzzling: Whereas an authorship 
                                                
20 See the Advocate General Kokott’s opinion in Commission/Technische Glaswerke 
Ilmenau, C-139/07 P, EU:C:2009:520, paragraph 59: Emphasis seems to be put there on 
the consideration that there is no a priori exemption of documents in a special area (for 
example state aids) and the requirement that any refusal has to be explained within the 
framework of one of the exceptions provided for in Article 4. 
21 Article 4(4) clearly calls for consultation and does not imply any veto. This issue was 
alleged in Case T-301/10 (judgment of 19 March 2013) by the applicant; the General 
Court did not decide in re materiae, but dismissed this plea on procedural grounds (see 
paragraph 103 of the judgment). 
22 For a very detailed and comprehensive analysis see A. Barav, Opacité et Transparence ou le 
droit d’empêcher : la jurisprudence en matière d'accès aux documents provenant des États membres détenus 
par les institutions communautaires, Chemins d'Europe, in MELANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN-
PAUL JACQUE, 2010, p. 29 – 62. 
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rule does not apply in the Regulation and mere holdership, or 
possession, of a document is what counts, “originatorship” may be 
different and confer special rights.23 And indeed, in the case of 
documents originating from a Member State, it is the much broader 
concept of origin that entitles the Member State to either request 
non-disclosure, or agree to disclosure24. That idea also underlies 
Article 5 (“Documents in Member States”) according to which, 
where a Member State receives a request for a document in its 
possession, but originating from an institution, the Member State 
shall consult with the institution concerned. 
B) Proposals for recasting or amending No 1049/2001 
In conclusion of that first part of the paper, several Commission 
proposals25 for recasting or amending Regulation No 1049/2001 
deserve mentioning.  
The 2008 proposal, which was subject to corrections made in 2009, 
concerns a comprehensive recast. The third proposal, submitted in 
March 2011, suggests punctual amendments, and notably tackles 
the matter of the so-called institutional scope26 in the light of the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
In the recitals of its explanatory memorandum, the third proposal 
reads that “[t]he Treaty of Lisbon has entered into force on 1 
December 2009. The legal base for public access to documents is 
now Article 15(3) of the consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. This new provision extends 
the public right of access to documents of all the Union institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies. The Court of Justice, the European Central Bank 
and the European Investment Bank are subject to this provision only when 
exercising their administrative tasks. The present Regulation only 
directly applies to the European Parliament, the Council, and the 
Commission.  
However, its application has been extended to the agencies by 
virtue of a specific provision in their respective founding acts. 
                                                
23 Judgment of 18 December 2007, Sweden/Commission, C-64/05 P, EU:C:2007, 802, 
paragraphs 45, 47 and 50: Under Article 4(5) “disclosure of that document by the 
institution requires the prior agreement of that Member State to be obtained. Since an 
‘agreement’ is legally different from a mere ‘opinion’, the very wording of Article 4(5) of 
Regulation No 1049/2001 precludes an interpretation to the effect that the provision 
merely confers on a Member State making use of the possibility given by that provision 
the right to be consulted by the institution before the institution decides, possibly despite 
the opposition of the Member State in question, to allow access to the document 
concerned. 
24 Judgment of 18 December 2007, Sweden/Commission, C-64/05 P, EU:C:2007, 802, 
paragraph 61: “Article 4(5) … potentially concerns every document ‘originating’ from a 
Member State, whoever their author may be, that a Member State transmits to an 
institution. Thus the only relevant criterion is the origin of the document and the handing 
over by the Member State concerned of a document previously in its possession.” 
25 COM(2011) 137 final 2 (mentioned above) and COM(2008) 229 final (30.4.2004) as 
well as COM(2009) 665. 
26 See for a very detailed analysis M. Maes, Le droit d’accès aux documents des institutions 
européennes : où en est la révision du règlement 1049/2001, REVUE DU DROIT DE L’UNION 
EUROPEENNE 3/2014, pp. 475 – 497. 
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Furthermore, a number of institutions and bodies have adopted 
voluntary acts laying down rules on access to their documents 
which are identical or similar to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 
[…] Even if, in practice, most institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the European Union apply Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 or similar rules on a voluntary basis, there is a legal 
obligation to extend the right of access to all of them in compliance with the 
Treaty. Since most of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies 
of the European Union apply the Regulation or similar rules, the 
institutional scope of the current Regulation can be extended to all 
of them, subject to the limits provided for by the Treaty regarding 
the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank and the European 
Investment Bank. The Commission considers, therefore, that 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 should be amended in view of extending 
its institutional scope in compliance with the new legal basis for access to 
documents provided for under Article 15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union without further delay.” (emphasis added) 
That proposal seems well-founded in law, since, as the 
Commission points out, “[m]ore than one year after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, there is still no perspective for the 
adoption of a new Regulation regarding public access to 
documents that will replace Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The 
discussions in the European Parliament and the Council have 
shown strongly diverging views about amending the Regulation.” 
And indeed, by May 2015, there has been neither an amendment 
in the above-mentioned, very narrow sense (that is to say, in a sense 
that the Regulation is put in closer keeping with primary law, on 
the addressees’ side of the medal), nor has there been a 
comprehensive recast of Regulation No 1049/2001 as proposed by 
the 2008/2009 Commission initiative.  
Those former and comprehensive proposals were made on 
account of experience gained in applying the Regulation, and with 
hindsight to the case-law relating to the Regulation. This led the 
Commission to the assumption that the institutions were – by 
2008/2009 – “in a position to reassess the working of the 
Regulation and to amend it accordingly”. Though that assumption 
may be correct, these proposals seem to reveal that diverging 
positions (held by the Parliament, the Council, and within the 
Council, by various groups of Member States) are still far from 
being reconciled27.  
To name but one example: According to the Commission, the 
scope of the Regulation is to be clarified. Indeed, a re-definition of 
the scope seems appropriate so it can be aligned with related acts28, 
such as Regulation No 1367/2006 on the application of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention. The Regulation’s scope may 
also need clarification where it collides with the scope of personal 
data protection, provided for by Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on 
                                                
27 M. Maes, Le droit d’accès aux documents des institutions européennes : où en est la révision du 
règlement 1049/2001, REVUE DU DROIT DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE, 3/2014, p. 475 (482). 
28 See COM(2008) 229 final, p. 6 and p. 12. 
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the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the 
free movement of such data29. 
In fact, the Commission suggested to reframe Article 2 along the 
following lines: “This Regulation shall not apply to documents 
submitted to Courts by parties other than the institutions […] 
Without prejudice to specific rights of access for interested parties 
established by EC law, documents forming part of the 
administrative file of an investigation or of proceedings concerning 
an act of individual scope shall not be accessible to the public until 
the investigation has been closed or the act has become definitive. 
Documents containing information gathered or obtained from 
natural or legal persons by an institution in the framework of such 
investigations shall not be accessible to the public.”30  
Those are quite material modifications suggested as to the 
Regulation’s framework!  
Most probably, the Commission proposal, if it were to come true, 
might affect the very core of the Regulation by transforming its 
scope and, as a consequence, give way to quite an upheaval. 
Needless to say that on the one hand, a limited scope means a 
restricted right of access, which is strangely contradicting the 
emphasis laid on openness and transparency in the preamble of the 
Regulation. On the other hand, a wide scope allowed for by 
Regulation No 1049/2001 –  as it is – is consistent with the firm 
commitment to those principles set forth in the preamble (and in 
primary law as well). It remains to be seen what course the EU 
legislator will finally choose, in the light of the by now abundant 
case-law which provide both the General Court and the Court of 
justice. 
Since that case law has a clear focus on the exceptions provided for 
in Article 4(2) and (3), they shall be treated in the next part of this 
paper. 
§ 2 – THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 4(2) AND 
(3), AND RELATED CASE-LAW 
The second portion of this paper will concentrate on the 
exceptions provided for to the right of access (Article 4 of the 
Regulation). This implies a concise presentation of those 
exceptions (A), to be followed by a brief summary of some of the 
recent case-law (B). 
A) Pattern of the exceptions laid down in Article 4(1), (2) 
and (3) 
I) To start with, it seems appropriate to provide an overview of 
what the exceptions contained in Article 4(1) and (2), (3) are dealing 
with. 
                                                
29 OJ, 8.12.2001, L 8, p. 1. 
30 COM(2008) 229 final, p. 16. See also, within the explanatory memorandum, p. 7 
(paragraph 3.2).  
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Paragraph 1 contains several possibilities for refusal of access. 
Under lit. a, public interests that may receive protection are 
numbered (public security, defense and military matters, 
international relations, financial, monetary or economic policy of 
the Community [Union] or a Member State). 
In contrast, lit. b refers to private interests (privacy and the integrity 
of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community 
legislation regarding the protection of personal data). It should be 
noted that access to a document may be refused only where 
disclosure would “undermine the protection” of the interests at 
stake. That is made clear by the wording of paragraph 1.31 
According to Paragraph 2, access is (in principle, see under II for 
further particulars) to be refused where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of commercial interests, court 
proceedings, or the purpose of inspections, investigations and 
audits (the latter frequently alleged by the Commission in 
competition cases, or at a certain stage of an infringement 
procedure). It may be noted that, as opposed to paragraph 1, 
paragraph 2 does not draw a distinction between public and private 
interests.  
From a conceptional standpoint, commercial interests of a natural 
or legal person (under the first indent32), court proceedings and 
legal advice (under the second indent33), and the purpose of 
inspections, investigations and audits (under the third indent34), 
may appertain either to the public or to the private sector, but the 
fundamental pattern remains the same, the common factual 
denominator being that there is always some on-going activity at 
stake (trade/commercial activities, judicial and legal counselling 
activities, or investigative activities). 
Paragraph 3 explicitly refers to documents for internal use in (on-
going) decision-making processes; structurally it is, with regard to 
its requirements, similar to paragraph 2. 
II) In contrast to paragraph 1, any exception based on an interest 
named in paragraph 2 or 3 requires that disclosure of the document 
in question would not only undermine the protection of a 
                                                
31 To paragraph 1 lit. a see (also below for further discussion): judgment of 4 May 2012, 
Sophie in’t Veld/Council, T-592/09, and on appeal: judgment of 3 July 2014, C-350/12 P, 
Council/Sophie in’t Veld (relating to lit. a, third indent “international relations”). 
32 As an example in case-law relating to Article 4(2) first indent (“commercial interests of 
a natural or legal person, including intellectual property”): General Court: judgment of 20 
March 2014, Reagens SpA/Commission, T-181/10, EU:T:2014:139 [also referring to the 
exception according to the third indent]. 
33 Examples in case-law relating to Article 4(2) second indent (“court proceedings and 
legal advice”): General Court: judgment of 27. February 2015, Breyer/Commission, T-
188/12; Court of justice: judgment of 21 July 2011, My Travel Group, C-506/08 P, 
EU:C:2011:496. 
34 Examples in case-law relating to Article 4(2) third indent (“the purpose of inspections, 
investigations and audits”): General Court: judgment of 16 April 2015, Schlyter/Commission, 
T-402/12 (ECLI-code not yet available); judgment of 25 September 2014, Spirlea/Commission, 
T-306/12; Court of justice: judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland/ 
Commission, C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738. 
 
Recent case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on public access to 
documents: Regulation (EG) No 1049/2001 and beyond – Uta Biskup, Wolfgang Rosch 
– 59 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
protected interest, but also that there is no overriding public 
interest in disclosure. 
In summary, 
– for paragraph 1, a two-step-test is required: The document must 
be covered by an interest as named in the provision, and disclosure 
would undermine the protection of that interest. In the light of the 
emphasis laid on transparency, that assessment involves striking a 
balance between the interests at stake35, with an onus placed on the 
institution to show why and how the protected interest is 
undermined; 
– for paragraphs 2 and 3, three-step-test is in order: first, a 
protected interest has to be identified, the disclosure of which 
would undermine its protection36. As a result of that, access may 
be refused “unless there is an overriding public interest in 
disclosure”, which again calls for a balancing of interests. 
B) Case-law concerning especially the exceptions set out 
in Article 4 of regulation No 1049/2001 
I) There are two requirements as to the level of substantiation on 
why and how disclosure of a document would undermine the 
alleged interest: first it must be shown that disclosure of the 
requested document would specifically and actually undermine the 
protected interest, and then there must be a foreseeable and not 
purely hypothetical threat (or risk) that the protected interest is 
undermined. 
As stated above, Regulation No 1049/2001 is intended to give the 
fullest possible effect to the right of public access to documents of 
the institutions. In the light of that, it is settled case-law that since 
the exceptions laid down in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 
derogate from that principle, they must be interpreted and applied 
strictly.37 
Thus, if the institution concerned decides to refuse access to a 
document which it has been asked to disclose, it must, in principle, 
“explain how disclosure of that document could specifically and actually 
undermine the interest protected by the exception – among those provided 
for in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 – upon which it is 
relying”38.“The mere fact that a document concerns an interest 
protected by an exception cannot justify application of that 
exception. Such application may “be justified only if the institution 
                                                
35 Judgment of 17 October 2013, Council/Access Info Europe, C-280/11 P, EU:C:2013:617, 
paragraph 32. 
36 The notion that Article 4 is based on balancing of opposing interests under a given 
situation is settled case law: see judgment of 27 February 2014, Commission/EnBW Energie 
Baden-Württemberg, C-365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 63. 
37 See judgment of 1 February 2007, Sison/Council, C-266/05 P, EU:C:2007:75, paragraph 63; 
judgment of 18 December 2007, Sweden/Commission, C-64/05, EU:C:2007:802, 
paragraph 66; judgment of 17 October 2013, Council/Access Info Europe, C-280/11 P, 
EU:C:2013:671, paragraph 30; and more recently judgment of 20 March 2014, Reagens 
SpA/Commission,T-181/10, EU:T:2014:139, paragraph 87. 
38 Judgment of 3 July 2014, Council/Sophie in’t Veld, C-350/12 P, paragraph 52. 
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has previously assessed, firstly, whether access to the document 
would specifically and actually undermine the protected interest 
and, secondly, in the circumstances referred to in Article 4(2) and 
(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, whether there was no overriding 
public interest in disclosure. Further, the risk of a protected interest 
being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely 
hypothetical.”39 
In other words, there is a high burden regarding onus and proof 
which is placed on the institution that wants to make use of an 
exception, with regard to sufficiently substantiate why and how 
disclosure would undermine the alleged interest (specifically and 
actually). The risk alleged must not be just abstract or hypothetical, 
but it “must be foreseeable and not purely hypothetical”. 
II) That general rule has been alleviated with regard to several 
categories of cases.  
To start with, a passage taken from the Commission v. EnBW 
judgment may provide an illustration of the practical impact of the 
problem: “in order to justify refusal of access to a document the 
disclosure of which has been requested, it is not sufficient, in 
principle for that document to be covered by an activity mentioned 
in Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The institution 
concerned must also provide explanations as to how access to that 
document could specifically and actually undermine the interest 
protected by an exception laid down in that article. […] However, 
the Court has acknowledged that it is open to the EU institution 
concerned to base its decision in that regard on general 
presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents, as 
considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to 
requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature”.40  
That means that according to well-established case-law, the serious 
requirements placed on the institutions have to be attenuated under 
certain circumstances: Though the principle remains unabashed 
(relying on the specific and actual undermining of a protected 
interest, with a prognosis that there must be a foreseeable, and not 
purely hypothetical risk, to be evidenced for every single document 
in question), practice has shown that there are documents similar 
to each other by nature. When such documents are at stake, it can 
be sufficient for an institution to fulfill the above-mentioned 
requirements by furthering considerations in more general terms, 
in other words: to rely on a general presumption with regard to 
certain categories of documents41 – or, one might add – with regard 
                                                
39 Judgment of 4 Mai 2012, Sophie in’t Veld/Council, T-529/09, EU:T.2012:215, 
paragraph 20. 
40 Judgment of 27 February 2014, Commission/EnBw Energie Baden-Württemberg, C-365/12 
P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraphs 64 and 65. 
41 Documents that can be described by means of the type of procedure in which they are 
exchanged and/or by means of specific regulatory schemes governing access to 
documents in particular areas. For the latter see, for example, Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón’s opinion in Case C-365/12 P, Commission/ EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg, 
EU:C:2013:643, paragraph 38. In that specific case, Regulation No 1/2003 on the 
implementation of the rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 [EC] and 82 [EC] is 
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to certain situations, or types of procedures, involving documents 
of a similar nature42. 
Accordingly, the Court has acknowledged the existence of such 
presumptions in various instances, and most prominently, 
– with regard to the documents in the administrative file relating to 
a procedure for reviewing State aid (see Commission v. Technische 
Glaswerke Ilmenau, paragraph 61);  
– with regard to the documents exchanged between the 
Commission and notifying parties, or third parties, in the course of 
merger control proceedings (see Commission v. Éditions Odile Jacob, 
paragraph 123, Commission v. Agrofert Holding, paragraph 64); 
– with regard to the pleading lodged by one of the institutions in 
court proceedings (see Sweden and Others v. API and Commission, 
paragraph 94)43; 
– with regard to the documents concerning an infringement 
procedure during its pre-litigation phase (see LPN and Finland v. 
Commission, paragraph 65);  
– with regard to the set of documents in a file relating to a cartel 
procedure (see Commission v. EnBw Energie Baden-Württemberg, 
paragraph 81). 
It is not yet clear, however, whether documents in EU pilot 
procedures – i. e. procedures of rather a general nature that in some 
cases may lead to a pre-litigation procedure – also form a consistent 
and homogeneous enough group for a general presumption to be 
applicable (see judgment of the General Court in Spirlea v. 
Commission, paragraphs 57 to 63, actually on appeal under case 
number C-562/14 P, Sweden v. Commission). 
What is typical of those cases is that the request for access does not 
apply to just one document, but (not in all actual cases, but in most 
of them) to a large set of document (so-called bulk requests). In 
that type of situation, recognition by the Court that there can be a 
general presumption enables the institution concerned to deal 
more swiftly with a global application and reply thereto 
accordingly44. 
The principle of refusal proceedings boils down to this: for each 
document, it has to be assessed, and shown, why and how access 
to it could specifically and actually undermine the alleged protected 
interest. However, with regard to certain categories of documents 
                                                
such a specific regulatory scheme. The Advocate General holds that “a holistic 
interpretation of the regulations applicable in the [respective] area is necessary” 
(paragraph 39) and emphasizes once again on the considerations of the Court in 
Commission/Agrofert Holding, C-477/10 P, paragraph 50, that there is “an inevitable 
interaction between… Regulation No 1049/2001 and particular… EU legislative 
instruments concerning access in relation to certain proceedings” (paragraph 40 of the 
opinion). 
42 Judgment of 1 July 2008, Sweden and Turco/Council, C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, 
EU:C:2008:374, paragraph 50. 
43 And recently judgment of 27 February 2015, Breyer/Commission, T-188/12, paragraph 77. 
44 See with specific reference to the judgment of 20 March 2014, Reagens SpA/Commission, 
T-181/10, EU:T:2014:139: Ch. Charalambous, “Reagens: Access to Documents Re the 
Inability of an Undertaking to pay the fine”, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
& PRACTICE 2014, Vol. 5 No. 7, pp. 466 – 468. 
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(and, apparently, types of procedures), the institution concerned 
can base its refusal on general presumptions which apply to 
categories of documents, insofar as considerations of a generally 
similar kind are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to 
documents of the same nature. 
It could be argued that accepting general presumptions in quite a 
number of categories has inversed onus and burden of proof 
between the institution and the applicant. However, the alleging of 
a general presumption is open to full judicial review45: in other 
words, an institution may – in the above-mentioned categories – 
rely on a general presumption and provide explanations and 
reasons why it considers it to be applicable. But that may be 
challenged by the applicant46, who was refused access on the 
grounds of such a general presumption, before the General Court, 
and eventually, on appeal, be taken to the Court. 
III) Apart from that, different levels of transparency are to be 
identified, depending on whether an institution is acting in its 
legislative capacity or for example in its administrative activity. 
Recital 6 of Regulation No 1049/2001 states: “Wider access should 
be granted to documents in cases where institutions are acting in 
their legislative capacity […]”. Accordingly, the EU Courts find 
that non-legislative activity “does not require such extensive access 
to documents as that required by the legislative activity of an EU 
institution”47. It is not yet clear whether that is to be construed as 
allowing for a kind of alleviation when it comes to state reasons for 
a refusal of access and/or relying on a general presumption for 
such a refusal. 
IV) The last portion of this paper now deals with the assessment 
of overriding public interests.  
When relying on an exception provided for in Article 4 (2) and/or 
(3), the institution in question has to examine on its own accord 
whether there might be such an overriding interest; on the other 
hand, the applicant can invoke it in order to challenge a refusal of 
access. 
First of all, it has to be kept in mind that the interest has to be a 
public one. 
Secondly, it should be stressed that it is not possible to invoke an 
overriding public interest against a refusal based on Article 4(1). As 
                                                
45 As a rule: full review, see in that sense with distinguishing arguments, judgment of 3 July 
2014, Council/ Sopie in’t Veld, C-350/12 P, paragraphs 62 to 68. 
46 See judgment 21 May 2014, Catinis/Commission, T-447/11, paragraph 43 (second 
sentence concerning the applicant’s possibility to challenge the applicability of a general 
presumption). 
47 Judgment of 27 February 2014, Commission/EnBW Baden-Württemberg, C-365/12 P, 
EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 91. See also General Court, judgment of 20 March 2014, 
Reagens SpA/Commission, T-181/10, EU:T:2014:139, paragraph 140: “… the interest of 
the public in obtaining access to a document pursuant to the principle of transparency … 
does not, where a document relates to an administrative procedure intended to apply 
rules governing competition law in general have the same weight as where the document 
relates to a procedure in which the institution in question acts in its capacity as a 
legislator.” 
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the General Court in Sophie in’t Veld v. Council (T-301/10, 
paragraph 110) points out: “it is clear from the wording of 
Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation […] 1049/2001 that, as regards the 
exceptions to the right of access provided for by that provision, 
refusal of access by the institution is mandatory where disclosure 
of a document to the public would damage the interests which that 
provision protects, without the need, in such a case and in contrast 
to the provisions, in particular, of Article 4(2), to balance the 
requirements connected to the protection of those interests against 
those which stem from other interests.” 
However, when the exceptions set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 are at 
stake, overriding public interest may be alleged by the parties. 
What is meant by an overriding public interest can best be 
explained in the field of competition law, in which undertakings 
rather often seek to gather information by means of an application 
under Regulation No 1049/2001. 
In a case already mentioned in this paper, the Commission found 
that a number of undertakings, including the applicant Reagens, 
had infringed Article 101 TFEU by participating in cartels. During 
the cartel (investigation) procedure, the applicant and two other 
undertakings requested that their inability to pay the fine be taken 
into account. Only one request submitted by one of the other two 
undertakings was accepted. This led Reagens to ask for access 
under Regulation No 1049/2001 to the non-confidential version 
of the cartel files. Reagens was denied access by the Commission, 
and the General Court confirmed this refusal. 
The applicant alleged an overriding public interest. However, such 
an interest is defined in case law as “an interest that is objective and 
general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or 
private interests that would outweigh for example the need to 
protect the interests of individual companies having made an 
application […] to maintain confidentiality of their applications 
and the related documents”48.  
The General Court admits the relevance of such an interest, but 
only to the extent that the requested information reflects the 
Commission’s policy and is not specific to the undertakings at 
issue. In the Reagens case, the applicant had claimed access to 
information with regard to undertakings, in order to gather further 
material for an individual request that inability to pay the fine be 
taken into account. That is a subjective interest and cannot 
constitute an overriding public interest. 
In other word, the interest to take into account having to be a 
public one, any request for access to the institutions’ documents is 
likely to fail if the applicant seeks information for his own sake, i. 
e. in order to prepare an action, for example an action for damages. 
                                                
48 Judgment of 10 March 2014, Reagens SpA/Commission, T-181/10, EU:T:2014:139, 
paragraph 131. More generally speaking, in the context of an overriding public interest 
“the right of access to documents does not depend on the nature of the specific interest 
which the applicant may or may not have in the information requested” (see Sison/Council, 
C-266/05 P, paragraph 44, and recently judgment of 21 May 2014, Catinis/Commission, T-
447/11, paragraph 61. 
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The latter aspect is illustrated by the Spirlea cases49, in which Mr. 
and Ms. Spirlea had made requests in order to obtain access to 
certain documents the Commission held. The Commission had 
gained possession of the documents within an EU pilot procedure 
with the German authorities. That procedure had been launched 
by the Commission on a complaint of Spirlea against those 
authorities for having infringed EU regulation in the field of 
medical therapies. The background of that case is sad, the motive 
for the complaint being that the Spirlea child allegedly died due to 
a wrongful therapy. However, their allegation of overriding public 
interest, invoked against the refusal based on Article 4(2) and (3), 
was dismissed by the General Court. It held that their request is 
essentially aimed at obtaining documentary proof for support of an 
action for damages, and that it cannot be admitted that the 
Commission – or any institution – is used as an instrument in order 
to gain access to proof that otherwise is not available.50 
CONCLUSION 
What can be concluded from the legal framework and its case law? 
Three points spring to mind. 
First, it is obvious that the intentions of the EU lawmaker with 
regard to openness and transparency are to be applauded. Second, 
there can be no denying that the conflicting interests at stake ask 
for constant vigilance, both on the legislator’s side as on the side 
of the Courts. Finally, case law has shown the utter imaginativeness 
of some applicants to use transparency proceedings for ends those 
proceedings were probably not meant for. Perhaps it is now up to 
the legislator to strike a new and clear balance, in the light of the 
case law of the Court. 
                                                
49 Judgments of 25 September 2014, Spirlea/Commission, T-669/11 and T-306/12. 
50 Judgments of 25 September 2014, Spirlea/Commission, T-669/11, paragraph 99, and T-
306/12, also paragraph 99. 
